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(self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses) or meet an expanded set
of criteria derived from "problem cases" (memory beliefs, for example).
Problem cases have in common what Sennett calls "universal sanction," that
is, they are typically held by virtually all cognizers, are held as essential to
normal living, and life without them is unthinkable. For example, life without
memory beliefs is difficult even to imagine, let alone live. Since theistic
beliefs do not enjoy universal sanction, there is good reason to accept modified foundationalism while rejecting theistic beliefs, and hence evidentialism
can be accepted while rejecting classical foundationalism. Universal sanction
provides, says Sennett, prima facie reason to accept evidentialism and to
reject the Reformed epistemology project.
But why should universal sanction provide prima facie reason to accept
evidentialism? Some of William Alston's arguments are relevant here. Universal engagement in an epistemic practice may indicate reliability, and hence
justification, but that says nothing about theistic practices. They may have their
own internal accounts-spiritual development, for example-providing prima
facie reason for taking the practices, and by extension, the beliefs, to be justified.
There is much more to discuss about Sennett's fine book than I can do here.
Despite the critical issues I raise, Modality, Probability, and Rationality is
well worth reading. In fact, it is a must for anyone interested in contemporary
analytic philosophy of religion, particularly those interested in Plantinga's
contributions.

Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga: An Introduction to Reformed
Epistemology, by Dewey J. Hoitenga, Jr. Albany, NY; State University of
New York Press, 1991. Pp. xvii and 263. $18.95 (Paper).

JAMES F. SENNETT, Palm Beach Atlantic College.
For over a decade now, debate concerning the epistemology of religious belief
has focused on the provocative arguments by Alvin Plantinga for the doctrine
known as "Reformed Epistemology"-the doctrine that theistic belief may
be fully justified without propositional evidence. The debate is well known.
What is not so well known is that the historical roots of Reformed epistemology are deep, widespread, and dialectically healthy. This is the contention of
Dewey Hoitenga, who presents an impressive and detailed investigation into
what he sees to be the philosophical ancestry of the doctrine. While Plantinga
claims to draw his ideas from the work of John Calvin and his interpreters,
Hoitenga contends that Calvin is only the tip of the philosophical iceberg.
Below the surface lie important contributions from Plato, the Bible, and
Augustine as well.
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Hoitenga begins by distinguishing two different doctrines of knowledge in
Plato. The first he labels "knowledge as acquaintance"-viz., "that which
results from direct experience of an object" (p. 8). Hoitenga derives this
doctrine from The Republic and contrasts it to that found in the Theatetus,
which is a forerunner of the contemporary doctrine of knowledge as justified
true belief. I It is the former doctrine-which I will call "the acquaintance
doctrine"-that Hoitenga identifies as that which gives rise to the tradition
that undergirds Reformed epistemology.2
Following his treatment of Plato, Hoitenga argues that the acquaintance
doctrine has great affinities to the conception of faith in scripture. Faith is
best understood biblically not as cognitive assent to a proposition (e.g., God
exists) but as trust of God and commitment to his will. Of course this trust
and commitment entail belief that God exists and belief of a number of
theistic propositions about the character and will of God, but this cognitive
element is not the central focus.
The biblical exegesis leads naturally into Hoitenga's extensive treatment
of Augustine. The center of this study is an examination of the Augustinian
formula "faith seeking understanding" (fides quaerens intellectum).3 The key
point here is one that incorporates both the biblical conception of faith as
trust and commitment and the Platonic acquaintance doctrine. Believers begin
with a trust of and commitment to God, grounded in belief based on testimony-Le., they begin with faith. This faith creates a desire to know Godnot just know about him. That is, the believer seeks a knowledge that comes
from direct acquaintance with God.
Thus Hoitenga interprets 'understanding' in the formula "faith seeking
understanding" as knowledge by acquaintance. Such knowledge is made possible by the Augustinian doctrine of God as present in the human mind and
directly accessible to reason. So "faith seeking understanding" expresses the
spiritual and epistemic pilgrimage of one who comes to trust God through
the preaching of the Word, then sets out through spiritual discipline and
devotion to come to recognize and know God directly through pure reason.4
After developing the case that Reformed epistemology does indeed have a
long and cherished heritage, Hoitenga turns to the two most prominent personages in the tradition: Calvin and Plantinga. Calvin stands apart from many
modern and contemporary theologians and philosophers of religion in his
insistence that knowledge of God is immediate and vital. '''There is within
the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an awareness of the divinity'
(sensus divinitatis)" (p. 150; quotation from the Institutes, I, iii, 1). Calvin
differs from Augustine in some important ways, but Hoitenga argues persuasively that they are in agreement on the most vital concern of Reformed
epistemology-that knowledge of God is to be had directly, and not as the
result of reasoned discourse or deliberative meditation.
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Hoitenga's treatment of Planting a identifies the two phases of his research
and teaching. In his earlier work-epitomized in the paper "Reason and Belief
in God," Planting a concentrates on removing any significant objections to
the claim that theistic beliefs might be "properly basic"-justifiably believed
immediately and without propositional support. In his more recent work
Plantinga constructs a positive epistemological theory on which the Reformed
epistemology story is plausible and explainable. Hoitenga shows both the
distinctive features of these two projects and the common thread between
them that makes them both defenses of the Platonic-Biblical-AugustinianCalvinist tradition he has traced.
In a final chapter Hoitenga addresses one of the most prevalent controversies in the current debate over Reformed epistemology-the proper role (if
any) of natural theology and apologetics within the Reformed framework.
Like Plantinga, Hoitenga sees a definite role for these practices-one that is
not simply allowable but needed. I will address his position in this regard at
the end of this review.
Hoitenga's book is impressive for the extent and quality of its historical
research and exegesis-particularly in the treatment of Augustine. It is worth
owning for this reason alone. There is a great wealth of information regarding
some of the most important figures in the history of religious epistemology.
Furthermore, it is my opinion that Hoitenga more than adequately defends
his general thesis that the Reformed epistemological position is one with a
deep, rich, and intriguing philosophical pedigree. He has taken a giant step
toward removing the widespread misconception among contemporary philosophers and theologians that this position was born in 16th-century Geneva.
Nonetheless, there are several features that significantly weaken the book's
effectiveness. I will list four.
First, despite Hoitenga's nearly one hundred pages on Augustine, I found
myself more confused than enlightened by this portion of the book. Many
different concepts are introduced and discussed in detail, and it is not always
clear what the relations among them are. Moreover, Hoitenga seems to use
critical terms like 'faith,' 'knowledge,' and 'understanding' in a variety of
different ways without providing the needed disambiguation. The study
would have been much more profitable had all the important senses of key
terms been introduced in the beginning, given separate labels, and then consistently treated under those labels.
Second, Hoitenga's treatments of Calvin and Plantinga are disappointing
in their brevity and sketchiness, especially when compared to the size and
detail of his treatment of Augustine. Even if Hoitenga is right about the deep
roots of the Reformed epistemology tradition, the fact remains that Plantinga
explicitly credits Calvin as the primary historical influence on his doctrine.
Unless Planting a is simply ignorant about the major influences on his own
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work-an hypothesis with at best dubious credibility-it would seem that an
extended examination of Calvin's views would be in order in any volume that
purports to be a history of Reformed epistemology. Yet the treatment of
Calvin is one-third as long as that of Augustine and comprises just a little
over ten percent of the entire volume.
Hoitenga's treatment of Plantinga-the undisputed champion of the Reformed epistemology cause-is even shorter than that of Calvin. That Hoitenga's combined treatment of both of these most central figures is barely
half as long and nowhere nearly as detailed as his treatment of Augustine
alone is puzzling at best.
Third, Hoitenga often appears less than careful in his philosophical explication and argumentation. I cite two examples. First, the following two passages appear within seven pages of one another in the chapter on Plantinga.
The justification of properly basic beliefs ... is external, not internal. [... ]The
latter implies that the knower has access to, and can therefore produce the
justification of his or her belief.. .. The former, however, does not imply such
access, for the reason that the justification of one's belief may be external to
one's state of mind (189; emphasis his).
Internalist theories typically involve deontological ingredients such as duties,
permissions, obligations, and rights-terms that appear ... in Plantinga's account of the justification of properly basic beliefs. In his theory of knowledge
as justified true belief, however, he moves away from these internalist notions
toward more externalist ones, similar to those at the center of reliabilist
theories (196).

Exactly what is Hoitenga saying about Plantinga's doctrine of proper basicality? Is it intemalist or extemalist? Of course, the first passage is not linked
explicitly to the intemalist-extemalist debate described in the second. However, the context is one in which the debate and its ramifications are very
close to the surface, and the use of these terms in that context is disruptive.
Hoitenga is either contradicting himself or unnecessarily confusing his readers. This kind of carelessness is frequent enough in the book to be quite
distracting.
Second, concerning the so-called "Reformed objection to natural theology"
Hoitenga notes that it "is essentially twofold, that [natural theology] is unnecessary and that it is inappropriate." Hoitenga correctly spells out the first
of these objections as the claim that the direct acquaintance theory of knowledge
of God that is at the heart of Reformed epistemology renders any arguments for
God's existence superfluous. However, when responding to this objection he
makes a very puzzling move. "The limitation of this Reformed objection to
natural theology should be obvious. It does not follow from the claim that we
have, by our very nature, a direct acquaintance with God that natural theology
is impossible" (219, emphasis his). He goes on to argue that it is indeed possible
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to do natural theology from a Reformed standpoint. But this point has nothing
to do with the objection he has stated. Certainly many things are possible but
unnecessary. Yet Hoitenga never makes the slightest connection between the
response he gives and the objection to which he is responding.
My criticisms of Hoitenga to this point have been largely procedural. I wish
to close with one substantive objection that strikes at the heart of one of
Hoitenga's primary motivations for his book. Hoitenga spends much time in
the last chapter arguing that apologetics is an appropriate and necessary
exercise for the church, even from the Reformed standpoint. Citing I Peter
3: 15,5 he argues that apologetics may be a requirement of the Christian duty
to love his neighbor. Part of this love may involve answering the unbeliever's
objections to Christianity in a way that will show the unbeliever that his lack
of faith is inconsistent with his own commitments. "If, as a result of such a
discussion, unbelievers give up their objections, the apologetic believers have
done something good for them, which is what love requires" (216).
But it is unclear exactly what the "something good" is that has been done
for the unbeliever. Has the believer given him reasons to believe, in the sense
that he has given him a propositional argument to bring him to faith? If this
is the case, then the believer has actually done a disservice to the unbeliever.
Since genuine knowledge of God comes through acquaintance, and not
through argument, the believer would do better to involve the unbeliever in
exercises designed to introduce him to God-whatever those might be. It is
at least clear that they cannot simply be the same exercises the evidentialist
would take the unbeliever through to convince him of God's existence-Le.,
the presentation of arguments; otherwise, the distinction between Reformed
epistemology and evidentialism collapses.
Perhaps Hoitenga would respond that apologetics is not designed to convince the unbeliever, but only to remove his objections. But these objections
would be in one of two forms: either reasons not to believe, or the complaint
that there are no reasons to believe. If apologetics removes the latter, it is
indeed an exercise in convincing and an affront to Reformed epistemology.
If apologetics removes only the former, then the only legitimate form is what
Hoitenga calls "negative apologetics"-the neutralizing of objections to
Christianity without added arguments for its truth. But Hoitenga makes it
clear that he is defending not just negative apologetics but natural theological
arguments as well.
In summarizing his defense of apologetics, Hoitenga says:
It does not follow, of course, that the unbeliever will give up his objection

or be converted by such reasoning, either by the arguments of natural theology or by the defenses of (negative) apologetics. Still, such arguments and
such defenses can be part of the believer's witness to the unbeliever, and this
is the main point (216).
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But exactly what part of the believer's witness are the arguments? If they
playa convincing role, then they represent either a mistreatment of the unbeliever or a compromise of the genius of Reformed epistemology. Perhaps
they serve only to convince the unbeliever that the believer is not irrational
in his commitments, even if the believer is not himself convinced of the truth
of the claims. But what business has the believer worrying about such matters? Time spent defending the epistemic honor of the believer would be
better spent introducing the unbeliever to the God known by acquaintance
(again, whatever that amounts to). Hence, there is something seriously inappropriate about engagement in such exercises.
Perhaps Hoitenga thinks that it is possible for natural theology to play a
vital role in the introduction of an unbeliever to the God known by acquaintance. But if he does he never makes it clear. Besides, as I intimated above,
such a position would constitute a significant departure from the tradition he
has taken great pains to explicate and defend. Suffice it to say that the
legitimate place, if any, of natural theology and apologetics remains one of
the more serious problems for the advocate of Reformed epistemology. Whatever merits Hoitenga's book has (and, as I have pointed out, it has many),
his attempt to solve this problem is far from successful.
NOTES
1. Of course much of the current debate in epistemology is motivated by the question
of whether or not knowledge is only justified true belief, or whether or not justification is
even the right way to think about the property that converts true belief into knowledge.
Nonetheless, most contemporary epistemologists agree, contra the alternative Platonic
position of knowledge as acquaintance, that knowledge is a species of belief, and is
distinguished from other true belief by some property that appropriately connects the
belief with the fact believed. In this sense, if in no other, modern epistemologists are
predominantly proponents of the justified true belief account of knowledge. See next note.
2. As mentioned in the above note, most contemporary epistemologists-Plantinga
among them-stand in the justified true belief tradition. In fact, Hoitenga himself offers
the beginnings of his own justified true belief theory at the end of the first chapter.
Nonetheless, Hoitenga makes it clear that the gap between these traditions can be bridged
so that a doctrine clearly opposed to Plantinga's provides the kind of historical support
for Reformed epistemology that Hoitenga claims.
3. On the application of this formula to the work of Augustine Hoitenga says:
The formula is not to be found in these exact words in Augustine's writings;
it first appears as the original title that St. Anselm gave to his Proslogion ... over six hundred years after Augustine's death. Still, everyone agrees
that the ideas captured in the formula not only originated in Augustine, but
also characterize his thought" (57).
Though I am naturally wary of any view attributed glibly to "everyone," and while I
am not sure what to make of the notion of ideas captured by a formula, I see little if any
problem with accepting Hoitenga's claim to orthodoxy.
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4. The similarity to Plato's notion of the philosopher seeking to recognize and know
the Fonns (particularly, the Good) directly through pure reason is unmistakable. Hoitenga
notes frequently that Plato's 'vrhe Good" becomes Augustine's God. In fact, in his
treatment of the acquaintance doctrine, Hoitenga points out that Plato treats knowledge
this way primarily when dealing with knowledge of the Fonns. Because of the mutability
of all but the Fonns Plato sees them to be the only genuine objects of knowledge.
5. "Always be prepared to give an answer to everyone who asks you to give the reason
for the hope that you have. But do this with gentleness and respect" (New International
Version).

